A LMOST SINCE the day it was issued, Humanae vitae (HV) has been xTL the signum cui contradicetur which Pope Paul VI anticipated it might become. The encyclical met with an opposition and dissent stronger and more public than any papal statement within memory, and the controversy that ensued quickly excited profound and even violent emotions and reactions.
On the other hand, the condemnation of artificial contraception remains official Catholic teaching and the principles on which it is based have either been repeated or presupposed in a series of official statements from Rome since 1968. Furthermore, besides attempting to provide a theological rationale for the encyclical's conclusion, defenders of HV claim to be able to point to a series of recent developments in which they see a fulfilment of the consequences which Pope Paul himself had foreseen would attend upon a rejection of his teaching. They refer to increasingly frequent interventions by governments in support of population control by illicit means, to the dehumanization of sexuality in referred, not to the papal teaching-role, but to the magisterium of the world-wide episcopate.
10 Magisterium ordinarium does not seem to have been used officially of the papal teaching-role until Humani generis (1950).
11
This is not to say, of course, that the "ordinary" teaching-role of the pope was not acknowledged before the phrase was used of him. In fact, most theologians today would regard the vast majority of papal magisterial interventions in the Church's history as falling under this category. This judgment itself reflects a clarity of distinction made possible by Vatican Fs careful restriction of papal infallibility to ex cathedra statements; things were not always seen so clearly before that. And it is remarkable how little attention was given at the beginning of the nineteenth century to what we call the "ordinary magisterium," intermediate between ex cathedra teachings and merely "private" papal teaching.
12
The increased attention to the ordinary papal magisterium accompanied an extraordinary increase in its exercise. Since 1740, when Benedict XIV began the series, 235 papal encyclicals have been issued, 199 of them since Gregory XVI, 49 by Leo XIII, 30 by Pius XI, and 41 by Pius XII.
13
And encyclicals, of course, are not the only instruments of the ordinary papal magisterium. The last edition of Denzinger's Enchiridion devotes nearly one third of its pages to the 150 years between Gregory XVI and John XXIII; all but two of the documents reprinted are from Roman sources, and of these only three are commonly considered infallible.
The frequency of these interventions was matched by the range of topics they covered and by the authority that was gradually claimed for them. Pius XII is said to have given nearly a thousand major addresses during his reign-an average of almost one a week-and they came close to covering the very generous extension of the magisterium's competence that pope claimed: "human activity, insofar as religious and moral issues are at stake." 14 benefited from the aura which Vatican Γβ definitions of papal primacy and infallibility had helped to create; and it was not uncommon for the careful limits within which the Council had confined its definitions to be forgotten or overlooked. A few theologians began to advance the view that the pope's ordinary magisterium was another locus of infallibility in the Church; 15 but even where this view was not shared, ordinary papal teachings were considered to ground a Wahrheitsbürgschaft, a morally certain guarantee that they were true. 16 Two other elements in this development should be noted. The first is the tendency of the ordinary papal magisterium to overshadow the magisterial role of the local bishop and of the universal episcopate. The pope became the "ordinary" teacher of the universal Church in the noncanonical sense of that adjective. Congar has noted that Denzinger's Enchiridion took hardly any note of local or regional episcopal statements, much less of statements by individual bishops. 17 The effect was to make the pope appear to be the single great teacher in the Church, and the bishops to be the administrators or executors of his doctrinal determinations.
18
But secondly, especially since Leo XIII, the popes increasingly concerned themselves not simply with settling disputes or judging in controversies, but also with actively promoting theological developments. One thinks of Aeterni Patris, Satis cognitum, Providentissimus Deus, Spiritus Paraclitus, Casti connubii, Mystici corporis, Divino afflante Spiritu, Mediator Dei, Humani generis, not to mention the great social encyclicals. In these and similar documents, the popes did not speak simply as "judges," but as "teachers" also, even as "theologians." They were engaging in the work of theology, and they promoted it in certain quite specific directions. These documents, as is well known, were usually composed by favored theological advisers and, at times, by theologians who had been involved in controversies about the very matters which became subjects of papal interventions. But because these documents 15 The discussion of the view as advanced by Vacant, Salaverri, Fenton, and Nau is reviewed in Peiffer, Die Enzykliken 72-100. The thesis has been revived, but without reference to the earlier debate, by Berbusse (n. 7 above) and seems to be taken for granted by Miceli ("A Forgotten Encyclical were issued in the name of the pope, they could not be treated as the works of theologians might be; they gained thereby a superior authority and thus, so theologians were told, could not be criticized for the quality or rigor of their argumentation. The result was to introduce official papal authority into the course of theological development at stages where once issues were considered to be the object of free theological debate. The effect was all the more unfortunate when the composers of the papal documents were drawn principally from a single "school" and when the documents themselves did not display that simplicity or caution which Innocent III had chosen when he spoke more apostolico} 9 The apogee of these developments was reached during the pontificate of Pius XII, and in Humani generis he made an authoritative statement about the authority of papal encyclicals:
Nor should it be thought that what is propounded in encyclicals does not of itself (per se) demand assent, since the pontiffs do not exercise the supreme power of their magisterium in them. For these things are taught by the ordinary magisterium, to which that word also applies, "He who hears you, hears me"; and quite often what is propounded and inculcated in encyclicals already belongs to Catholic doctrine on other grounds. But if the supreme pontiffs purposely pass judgment on a matter until then under dispute, it is clear to all that the matter, according to the mind and will of the same pontiffs, can no longer be considered a subject of free discussion among theologians.
20
Pius XII repeated or applied this teaching several times in the years that followed, particularly stressing its implications for the role of theologians in the Church.
21
In Lumen gentium 25, the Second Vatican Council included a section on the ordinary magisterium of the pope, a passage which was to play a central role in the debates that followed the issuance of HV. The text read:
This religious submission of will and mind is to be given in a special way to the authoritative magisterium of the Roman pontiff even when he is not speaking ex cathedra, in such a way that his supreme magisterium is respectfully acknowledged and sincere assent is given to judgments made by him, according to his manifest mind and will which is made known principally either by the character of the documents, by the frequent proposal of a teaching, or by his manner of teaching.
19 "Haec ergo tibi scholastico more respondemus. Sed si oporteat nos more apostolico responderé, simplicius quidem sed cautius respondemus" (PL 216, 1178 This passage is clear enough, but, as with many other statements of the Council, a full appreciation of it requires attention to its elaboration and its context. 22 The final text omits two sections proposed in the initial Schema de ecclesia, one of which had described the usual organs of the ordinary papal magisterium, while the other had reproduced Pius XII's prohibition of public debate of matters on which a pope had passed judgment. 23 An effort to have the latter restored to the text was unsuccessful, and for a resolution of questions about scholarly dissent and the freedom of theological inquiry the bishops were directed to consult the standard expositions in the manuals.
24
The Council's description of this teaching-role must also be placed against the backdrop of the entire ecclesiology of Lumen gentium. The Council made a major effort to overcome the primarily juridical framework within which much recent Roman Catholic ecclesiology had been developed and which had predominated in the first Schema, and also to balance what Vatican I had asserted about the papacy by its own teaching on the role of the episcopate. Both efforts resulted in a certain shift in emphasis. Before discussing the nature and role of hierarchical authority in the Church, the Council had placed chapters on "the Mystery of the Church" and on "the People of God"; and the latter included a clear statement on the infallibility of the whole believing community. 25 The papal magisterium itself was discussed within the larger framework of the teaching-role of the bishops. Their magisterial authority, singly and collectively, was strongly asserted, and the effort was made to strike a balance between the unique role of the pope in the episcopal college and a view of the rolé of bishops that sees them as something more than mere "vicars of the Roman pontiffs."
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The new balance sought was in large part realized and seen to have been realized in the very event that was the Council. For the first time in anyone's experience, the highest teaching authority in the Church was being exercised collegially and not simply by the pope. Neither the publication of fTVnor the reactions it provoked among so many Catholics are fully intelligible without a knowledge of the historical developments briefly described above. The encyclical was issued on the basis of a view of the ordinary teaching-role of the pope that had been elaborated over the last hundred years. But the framework within which that view had been articulated and exercised had been severely criticized at the Second Vatican Council, which itself had demonstrated a different model of magisterial authority. Moreover, a theological reconsideration of the magisterium had begun even before HV was issued, and the publication of the encyclical only accelerated and sharpened its development. Some of the main Unes of the critique that was instituted must now be reviewed.
Recent Developments in Theology of Magisterium
The most basic issue, of course, is the relationship between the magisterium and the whole Church. The classical view conceives of this relationship as a "descending" or "participatory" movement. Christ entrusts the depositum fidei to the apostles and their successors; these "possess" it and it is they who transmit it to the faithful, whose role is the primarily passive one of receiving it from them in obedience. 28 This paradigm places the pope and bishops (the ecclesia docens) between Christ or the Spirit and the faithful (the ecclesia discens).
An alternate and more adequate model inserts the magisterium of the pope and bishops within the whole body of believers, to whom Christ is 27 "A major reason for the malaise provoked by the encyclical comes from the fact that, as it happened, one man decided alone. This was resented in the Church the more strongly because the Council and the proclamation of episcopal collegiality were such recent events. During the four years of the Council, after all, one saw all the bishops participating in the elaboration of the doctrinal documents which would engage the authority of the Church; and, besides, the circulating of inquiries and reflections, of requests and debates, spread through the whole body of the Church, which, as a whole, was truly interested in them. It then appeared very surprising that a single man decided alone a point so difficult and delicate, which so closely touched the personal lives of the Catholic faithful" (B. immediately present in his Spirit of grace and truth. The magisterium exists and has authority within the Church by divine institution, and so it is not a derivation from the community in a modern democratic sense. But it exists and functions within the Church and not above it, and its insertion in the life of the Church is a constitutive principle of its authority and an indispensable presupposition of its effective exercise. This shift in paradigms entails a shift also in the manner of conceiving the relationship between the magisterium and the other "bearers" of revelation and grace.
29 On the classical model, these are all filtered through the magisterium, which is conceived as the regula veritatis próxima et universalis in distinction from the Scriptures and tradition, which are the "remote" rule of faith because they need authoritative interpretation by the "living magisterium." 30 In Humani generis Pius XII gave a particularly clear expression of this view. The magisterium is "the proximate and universal norm of truth because to it Christ the Lord has entrusted the whole deposit of faith-the Scriptures and divine 'tradition*-for safeguarding, defense, and interpretation." Theologians are strongly urged to go to the inexhaustible sources of revelation; "for it is their role to point out how what the living magisterium teaches is found, explicitly or implicitly, in the Scriptures and in the divine 'tradition/" But, since it is the unique task of the magisterium "to illumine and enucleate what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and implicitly," it would be a false method to attempt "to explain what is clear by what is obscure." Instead, "the noblest task of theology is to show how a doctrine defined by the Church is contained in the sources ... in that very sense in which it has been defined by the Church."
31
As Bernard Sesbouë has pointed out, 32 this theological method is a one-way street, from the magisterium to the "sources" of revelation but not back again. The magisterium illumines the Scriptures and tradition, but the obscure cannot throw light on the clear. When, in the extreme, the magisterium is thought to be sibi fons veritatis, 33 the constitutive 29 "Bearers" is a term borrowed from sociology to refer to institutional, personal, social, cultural "carriers" or "mediators" of meaning. The notion is used effectively (though with a more restricted reference than I give it) in Mysterium salutisi Grundriss heilsgeschicht- 
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The ecumenical sterility of this view hardly needs to be pointed out, 36 but this view does not even adequately describe the concrete manner in which the Christian message is borne from one generation to another. For, in fact, this is accomplished through the interworking of a whole complex of "bearers" of authority: the Scriptures, the tradition, the magisterium, the sensus fidei, holy living, the liturgy, theological scholarship, etc. All of these are community realities, and it is only within the community of faith which they all mediate and realize that any one of them-including both the Scriptures and the magisterium-works effectively or is accepted as an authority. They are interrelated organically and not hierarchically, and the Church's ever-growing apprehension of the meaning of Christ's revelation derives from the distinctive and cooperative contributions of them all. No one of them is more "remote" or more "proximate" than the others; they "mediate" one another, in the sense that they all provide the intelligible and vital context outside of which no single one of them can exist or function properly. None of the great exclusive claims, then, adequately describes the concrete functioning of "authority" in the Church: not the sola Scriptura, not the soli magisterio, not the lex orandi, not the sensus fidelium. Authority in the Church, like the community of faith itself, is circumamicta varietate. reduced the process of doctrinal discernment in the Church to an undifferentiated free-for-all. But the fuller view widely recommended today need not espouse undifferentiation. It can build upon a recognition that the diverse bearers of the Christian message have distinct roles and manners of fulfilling them. The Scriptures have their authority, and the tradition has its. The magisterium does not have their constitutive role nor does it benefit from the charisms of revelation or inspiration on which their authority is founded; but it is promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit for its role of communicating, defending, and interpreting the revelation of Christ. The sensus fidei includes all of these but is in turn mediated by their contributions. The liturgy celebrates and realizes the central mystery around which all focus, and holy men and women make the gospel's meaning and value effective in daily living. Difficulties arise when any one of the bearers is isolated out from among all and given a unique regulative role over the rest. Once again sapientis est ordinare, which need not mean, of course, sub-ordinare.
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A further implication of the paradigm shift we are considering concerns the role of the pope: as the magisterium must be seen to function within the whole body of the Church, so the papal role must be seen to operate within the whole body of the episcopate. On the level with which I am concerned here, this is less a matter of choosing among the complex theories that attempt to explain the relationship between primacy and collegiality than it is of choosing between two governing images. As the papal magisterial role became more frequent and more insistent, we became accustomed to assigning paradigmatic significance to the figure of the lonely pontiff agonizing over controverted issues in the privacy of his chambered conscience. 40 In exaggerated presentations (which have not been all that rare), this image abstracts the pope not only from among the faithful but also from the episcopal college: "docet et non docetur, confirmât et non confirmatur." 41 The effective power of this image was, 39 A basis for this view may be found in Dei verbum 10, in the statements that "the magisterium is not above the Word of God but serves it" and that "by God's most wise counsel, sacred tradition, sacred Scripture, and the magisterium of the Church are so linked and associated with one another that one of them cannot stand without the others and that, working together, each in its own way, under the action of the Holy Spirit, they all contribute effectively to the salvation of souls. of course, immensely aided by the fact that Vatican I was not able to complete the integral ecclesiology it had intended and also by some of the misunderstandings to which its famous "ex sese non autem ex consensu ecclesiae" so easily gives rise.
It would seem that in the normal case at least, the paradigm should be drawn rather from the manner in which ecumenical councils proceed (or should proceed). There open and free debate, the pitting of argument against argument, compromise and conciliation, head towards a final decision about which there can be at least the moral unanimity of all involved. In that process the issues at stake are openly debated; inadequate or prejudicial expressions are challenged and unconvincing arguments exposed and refuted; and if the process does not result in a generally acceptable determination or formulation, the matter is left unsettled. Such a process can create the conditions for the reception of its determinations, for the open consensus thus arrived at in the process grounds a reasonable expectation that the whole Church will be able to recognize its faith and its life in the resolutions reached. I am not here proposing that ecumenical councils become more frequent phenomena in the Church (though that suggestion has been urged), but that the giveand-take of conciliar debate in fact more closely describes the process by which the Church comes to apprehend more clearly what the gospel means and requires than does the in any case somewhat mythical figure of the single pope (or single bishop) resolving complex and controverted issues by himself.
To regard doctrinal discernment as a process is, further, to locate it firmly in history. Doctrinal development is not an abstract matter of deductions from first principles, natural or revealed. It is a complex historical process by which, in a given period, in response to particular problems and questions, and with the spiritual, intellectual, conceptual, and linguistic resources available, the Church attempts to understand and apply the gospel and succeeds more or less adequately. The resolution of controverted issues is not the simple process which a propositional view of revelation and a deductivistic ideal of theological method make it appear to be. It is a process that heads for understanding, judgment, decision, expression; and history demonstrates what perhaps might have the Roman Pontiff in matters of faith and morals, whether solemnly exercised infallibly ex cathedra or otherwise officially expressed rests wholly and exclusively upon the mandate entrusted by Christ to Peter and his successors as His vicars upon earth. It is independent, unconditioned by any dependency upon the approval or consent of others within the Church. Second, the authenticity and authority of the magisterial functions of a bishop or severalty of bishops is wholly contingent upon union and agreement with the Roman Pontiff." Neither of these two "professions" can be derived from Vatican I, much less from Vatican II. been expected, that it proceeds not logically but dialectically, through "the antithesis of ideas, the slow clarification of the question, the gradual elimination of impossible answers." 42 Since it is not promised new revelations or inspirations, the Church can only rely on the unfailing promise of the Lord that his Spirit will lead us into all the truth; and that promised assistance does not elevate us beyond the necessity of working out answers in the only way we know how, by venturing hypotheses, reviewing data, reconsidering presuppositions, listening and learning, and, it may be, having simply to wait for further light at a later time. This is not to reduce truth to the status of an eschatological ideal (though we might remember that understanding must await the final revelation); but it is to say that the discovery of the truth in the course of the Church's history is the discovery of the truth, and we have no reason to think that it occurs except through processes familiar to us in other fields of investigation and through events in our individual and ecclesial consciousness that are not strange to the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted.
This position requires in turn a reconsideration of the relationship between doctrinal authority and theological reasoning. The classical view of the magisterium places an enormous emphasis on the formal authority of the pope and bishops, whose teachings are said to have an authority independent of and superior to the reasons they do or even can advance in support of them. My hunch is that the widespread application of this principle to the ordinary magisterium is borrowed from the fairly common interpretative principle that, in the case of infallible teachings by council or pope, only the conclusion is guaranteed and not the arguments with which it is illustrated or defended. But even here, it should be noted, the theological reasoning employed in the preparation and expression of a teaching has great significance for the interpretation of the teaching itself and even for an evaluation of its authority.
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However that may be, one may wonder if the principle of formal authority should operate so powerfully while a doctrinal controversy is in full course, that is, before it has reached a definitive resolution. The issue seems to turn on the understanding of the ground for the special authority claimed for the magisterium, namely, the assistance of the Holy Spirit. I think it has to be admitted that theological reflection on this charism is in a rather undeveloped state. 44 In the general literature, not much more is claimed than that this "assistance" is distinct from both "revelation" and "inspiration" and that its promise to teachers in the Church is the fundamental basis for their authority. If the theological notion remains undeveloped, that cannot be said of its use in controversies, which is primarily "dogmatic." The assistance of the Holy Spirit is often invoked to supply for the reasoned argument with which all other teachers are expected to be able to demonstrate their authority. Both with regard to its undeveloped state and with regard to its controversial use, the "assistance" of the Spirit is somewhat in the position of the notion of biblical "inerrancy" until fairly recently. The latter was commonly employed to exclude a priori the presence of any error in the Scriptures; in similar fashion, the notion of divine "assistance" is used to turn aside as illegitimate objections to reasonings employed in magisterial statements on the grounds that the Spirit guarantees the conclusion. As the earlier, deductivistic notion of inerrancy has had to give way to a concrete reading of the Bible, so, I think, the notion of divine "assistance" to the magisterium has to be brought down and shown to be concretely intelligible in the process of doctrinal discernment.
The traditional discussion of the divine "assistance" does include one very valuable element for such an effort. The promised aid of the Spirit does not excuse pope or bishops from using all appropriate and available means for investigating and interpreting Christ's revelation. 45 These may include consulting the other bishops, theologians, the faithful, and all the other "bearers" of the tradition. The necessity of employing such needs is also the necessity of theological reasoning, which is why Pope Paul recently spoke of this as "a supremely important, intrinsic, and necessary duty of the ecclesiastical magisterium." 46 This certainly would seem to imply that the magisterium must have theological reasons behind what it teaches; and it is this necessity that leads a number of theologians today to urge that it is at least a practical mistake and perhaps also a theoretical one for the magisterium to place such great emphasis on its formal authority. 47 The intrinsic necessity of theological reasoning in the magisterial process should also mean that it is not illegitimate to ask of an authorized teacher "Why do you teach this? How did you arrive at this conclusion? How is it related to the central truths of the gospel?" And it is not the destruction of fallible authority to allow that the answers to such questions be tested in the public process of ecclesial discernment by which the whole Church seeks to understand and apply the gospel. 48 Finally, the reconsideration of the magisterium's role in the Church has very recently given rise to interest in the notion of ecclesial "reception."
49 On a juridical notion of the magisterium, for which this is essentially a Lehrgewalt, a power to teach with obligatory force, "reception" can only or at least chiefly mean "obedience." One follows Thomas Stapleton's rule 50 and determines whether the teacher is legitimately authorized to teach; but once that is determined, the required response is clear. But when the magisterium is understood to be in organic relationship to the whole Church and to the other "bearers" of authority in the Church, the "reception" of magisterial enactments takes on fuller dimensions than those of mere obedience to legitimately promulgated "laws." It can include, beyond the discernment and acknowledgment of the formal authority, an appreciation of the concrete measures taken, of their adequacy, and of their value for the life of the Church. The whole community of believers does not appear here simply as the passive recipient of decrees from on high, but as the conditioning matrix within which any formal instance has authority. Theological reflection on "reception" is only in its infancy, and so it has not yet found a completely satisfactory or critical statement. 51 But that it can point to historical facts and to theoretical considerations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the reception-as-obedience notion is already clear. There are the examples of the constitutive "reception" by the Church of the apostolic canon, creed, ministry, and liturgy. 52 There are the historical processes by which the whole Church "received" the great ecumenical councils of antiquity and even those of more recent times.
53 There are the cases in which the determinations of local or regional councils were "received" by the Church as having an authority beyond what their "formal" character could require. There are the processes of "re-reception," as, for example, of Ephesus in the light of Chalcedon or of Vatican I in the light of Vatican II. All these are manifestly a diverse lot of phenomena, but there is a common element of "reception" in them all, which deserves serious theological reflection.
If there is an interpretative and evaluative dimension to "reception" even in the case of constitutive and infallible instances of authority, 54 that 51 The definitions of "reception" are often rather vague, but the reality is very complex. I think Congar ("La Réception' " 399-401) is correct in suggesting that the meaning of the term will be clarified only with the help of a theory of authority; until then one must admit a certain validity to the reservations expressed by Descamps ("Théologie et 54 The first of these refers to the "reception" by the Church of realities in which it recognizes a divine authority (another way of referring to ius divinum). That the Church's "reception" of infallible pronouncements is not simply mechanical is clear in Lumen gentium 25: "But the assent of the Church can never be lacking to such definitions because of the action of the same Holy Spirit, by which the whole flock of Christ is preserved and grows in the unity of the faith" (an explanation neatly summed up in the expensio dimension must a fortiori be acknowledged for the "reception" of enactments of lesser authority. 55 This really is nothing new, for the Church has always effected a discrimination in its reception of these authoritative determinations, some of which thus come to possess enduring value, some of which prevail for a while but later are forgotten, some of which seem to fall stillborn from the press. Nor, commonly, is this discrimination directed by the hierarchy itself; there is no official canon by which the Church has discriminated among the 235 papal encyclicals, and, for good or ill, Rome does not usually declare with what degree of authority it is acting. The whole Church "receives" what it finds useful and valuable and, sooner or later, lets shp what is not. Finally, it may be noted that theologians have always been considered to have a major role in this evaluative process of "reception," as the very phrase "theological notes" indicates.
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Finally, the new interest in the idea of "reception" is simply part and parcel of the effort to restore the communal context within which authority works effectively. That context was badly neglected in the ecclesiology which prevailed while the classical view of the magisterium was being formed; and until that grave omission is repaired, discussions about the magisterium are likely to be fruitless. To restore the communal context, two intellectual efforts will be necessary: a fuller historical study of the authority-Church dialectic 57 and an attempt to make use of contemporary social theory to articulate a theology of authority in the Church that is more adequate, both theoretically and practically, than the classical view. 
Conclusion
The developments surveyed above are offered to assist an understanding of the "reception" which HV has received and, more particularly, of how it is that a good number of Catholics believe that they may dissent from the encyclical and do so while remaining Catholics. In the continuing reception-process, besides the different evaluations of the papal argument and conclusion, there also are widespread and in some cases fundamental differences with regard to more "formal" issues: the relationships between Church and magisterium and between magisterium and other "bearers" of Christian authority, the paradigms of authority and its exercise, the relationship between doctrinal authority and theological reasoning, the notion of ecclesial "reception." It is perhaps clear at least that any resolution of the continuing controversy about HV will not only have to settle the "material" questions, but will require also the emergence of a greater consensus than now exists on the ecclesiological issues.
AUTHORITY OF THE TRADITION
Questions about the formal authority of the papal condemnation of artificial contraception do not concern only the force of the encyclical itself; they also involve an interpretation of the authority of the tradition within which HV claimed to stand. No one seems to disagree with the fundamental conclusion of John Noonan that from the third to the twentieth centuries both the official teachers of the Church and Catholic theologians have consistently and unanimously condemned artificial techniques of contraception. 59 Noonan's work was known to both the "majority" and the "minority" on the Papal Commission: the former seem to have adopted Noonan's own view that the tradition was not of such force as to preclude further development and even change, while the "minority" accepted his data but disagreed with his interpretation of it. Noonan's work has been criticized on certain of its details, 60 but his judgment that the tradition has been unanimous has not been seriously challenged. The question at issue, then, concerns the authoritative weight to be assigned to this tradition. Those who disagreed with Pope Paul's teaching manifestly did not believe that the tradition was strong enough to settle the issue by itself. Many of those who supported the papal conclusion referred in at least general terms to the constant tradition, and some of them have urged more specifically that the constant and universal tradition is of such a nature as to constitute an infallible exercise of the universal ordinary magisterium. 61 I propose here to offer some primarily hermeneutical considerations that I believe should guide a criticism of this, the strongest claim made for the traditional condemnation.
Infallibility of Universal Ordinary Magisterium
The argument builds upon statements about the universal ordinary magisterium made by both Vatican Councils. At Vatican I, the third chapter of Dei Filius included a brief paragraph on the object of faith:
Further, all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the Word of God, written or handed down, and which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by its ordinary and universal magisterium, proposes to be believed as having been divinely revealed.
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The direct source of this statement was Tuas libenter, in which Pius IX had taught that the submission of divine faith could not be limited simply to matters expressly defined in ecumenical councils or in papal decrees, "but must be extended also to those matters which are handed down by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church throughout the world and are therefore unanimously and constantly considered by Catholic theologians to belong to the faith." having to be held definitively, they infallibly proclaim Christ's teaching.
The previous draft of this passage had described the object of this teaching-exercise as "the revealed faith"; the more general phrase, "matters of faith and morals," was substituted "lest it seem that the infallibility of the episcopal body is limited only to matters proposed by it to be believed as having been divinely revealed. However, it is added that it is a case of their proposing an opinion tamquam definitive tenendomi That there is an extension of the object of infallibility beyond what Vatican I explicitly stated is clear from the explanation given later that this object "has the same extension as the revealed deposit; and therefore it extends to all those things, and only to those things, which either directly relate to the deposit itself or are required if that same deposit is to be guarded religiously and expounded faithfully."
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It is on these three texts that the argument has been constructed that the universal and constant condemnation of contraception represents an infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium of the episcopate. I do not intend to deal with this claim directly, but to supply some principles which might guide a critical evaluation of the argument. Before addressing the question of the infallible ordinary magisterium, I want first to suggest two general considerations.
The first is the principle that it is the part of wisdom to be strict in the interpretation of magisterial statements, following the guidance of the Code: "Declarata seu definita dogmatice res nulla inteUigitur nisi id manifeste constiterit." 66 While the immediate reference of this canon is, perhaps, to solemn definitions, it articulates a hermeneutical principle of general application in the evaluation of other magisterial pronouncements. Infallibilia non sunt multiplicandaSecondly, magisterial texts have meanings within historical contexts. This principle, which had become a commonplace of Catholic hermeneutics over the previous thirty years, finally received authoritative confirmation in Mysterium ecclesiae (1973). This document acknowledges (1) that the meaning of magisterial pronouncements "depends in part on the expressive power of the language used at a certain time and in particular circumstances"; (2) that a dogmatic truth may first be stated incompletely and only later receive a fuller and more perfect statement; (3) that magisterial statements intend not only to elucidate the Scriptures and tradition but also to respond to certain questions and to preclude certain errors; and (4) that magisterial statements "sometimes" are expressed in "the changeable conceptions of a given epoch. reference of these very cautious statements is to dogmatic declarations, they surely apply also to statements of lesser authority. Unfortunately, neither in this document nor in many other treatments of the hermeneutics of magisterial statements is much attention given to the distinct problems raised when teachings concern "morals" rather than "faith." But if the old tag is true that "verum et falsum sunt in mente, bonum et malum autem in rebus," then interpreters must attend not only to the concrete minds whose judgments are true or false but also to the concrete situations within and about which such minds make true or false moral judgments. Such judgments, in other words, suffer from a double concreteness or "historicity."
This general hermeneutical principle requires the interpreter to investigate a text in its historical and literary context. That context, particularly when it is a question of moral teachings, is concrete: at a certain time certain questions are being asked out of certain presuppositions in pursuit of a solution to certain problems. The conclusion reached is first intelligible only within the terms ofthat problematic and of the arguments used in order to establish or defend it. While there may be some validity to the distinction made between the conclusion and the argumentation, it should not be pressed, again particularly in moral questions, to the point of an artificial separation of meaning and truth or value. It is, of course, possible that someone may arrive at a correct conclusion by faulty logic or on the basis of inadequate data. But it may also happen that a conclusion is reached to a particular problem principally or even only because of the limited intellectual, conceptual, linguistic, etc. capacities of the moment. In the latter case, it cannot be assumed that those who reached the judgment within the limits of their age would do so if those limits are expanded. 68 In considering such possibilities, one is forced to associate conclusion and argument much more closely than is sometimes done.
With those general principles in mind, we may now look more closely at the question of the infallibility of the universal ordinary magisterium. Since our concern is principally with the formal question, it may be helpful to apply to this instance of the magisterium the technique which Bishop Gasser used at Vatican I in order to indicate the limits within which the papal magisterium could be considered infallible. 69 This consists simply in considering the "subject," the "object," and the "actual 68 There is an important hermeneutical issue at stake here, which has become very clear in the controversies about the interpretation of the traditional exclusion of women from the priesthood.
69 See Mansi 52,1214. There is not much literature on the hermeneutics of the universal ordinary magisterium. Many manuals are very brief in treating the matter itself, and few offer even principles for determining how one applies the rule. The difficulties are not dissimilar to those encountered in making use of the sensus fidei.
exercise" of the universal ordinary magisterium which are necessary if it is to be considered to be teaching infallibly.
Subject of Universal Ordinary Magisterium
The subject of an infallible exercise of the universal ordinary magisterium is not individual bishops taken singly, but the whole body of bishops who are in communion with one another and with the pope. Individual bishops are not infallible; that degree of authority requires the moral unanimity of the body of bishops. Vatican II deliberately refrained from settling the question whether or not this infallible exercise constituted a "collégial" act; but Lumen gentium did require that the bishops be joined by "the bond of communion."
Communio is one of the most important words in the ecclesiological lexicon of Vatican II, but its meaning is not always clear. 70 The famous Nota explicativa praevia appended to the third chapter of Lumen gentium did give some brief indication of the meaning of "communion" with respect to the episcopal college:
Communio is a notion held in high honor in the ancient Church (as also today especially in the East). But it is not to be understood as some vague sentiment (affectus), but as an organic reality which requires a juridical form and at the same time is animated by love.
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Clearly this explanation was designed to calm the fears of the minority at Vatican II that the hierarchical relationships in the Church were threatened by the use of the word "communion" to describe them. It is not clear that the Nota praevia contributes anything else.
We are left to make our way through two extremes. One would so dissolve "communion" as to make it compatible with any degree of doctrinal or disciplinary disagreement. The other would read "hierarchical communion" as simply equivalent to "hierarchical subordination." We are dealing with the complex problem of the relation between papal primacy and episcopal collegiality. But it is not simply a question of the relation between "the full, supreme, and universal power" which the pope may always exercise freely and the "supreme and full power over the universal Church" of which the integral body of bishops is the subject, While that problem remains to be resolved, it may be pointed out that the requirement in Lumen gentium 25 that the bishops be in communion with one another and with the pope refers to a formal condition necessary for an exercise of their authority to be considered infallible. It does not describe the actual exercise of their authority. "The bond of communion," in other words, describes not the unanimous agreement of the bishops, but rather a prior condition that must be fulfilled for their unanimous agreement to be invested with supreme authority. This would seem to demand the possibility that a bishop could be in communion with the head and other members of the college even while he disagreed with him or them on a particular matter. If this were not possible, there could be no significance in the agreement of the world-wide episcopate, and Vatican II's statement would be reduced either to the banal or to the tautological. The theoretical possibility of a bishop's disagreeing within the episcopal college rests in the fact that his office is founded not in delegation but in ordination, and that in exercising it he acts out of his own "proper, ordinary, and immediate" power. The practical possibility of such disagreement rests, among other things, on his perception of the theoretical possibility and on his being given a genuine ecclesial freedom to act in his own name.
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The first condition for an infallible exercise of the universal ordinary magisterium, then, is that in such freedom-in-communion the body of bishops be in moral unanimity in their teaching. 75 The distinction between "primary" and "secondary" objects is not altogether adequate, especially with regard to moral matters; but to set out a different framework here would be distracting.
Object of Universal Ordinary Magisterium
this "secondary object" extends; the only principle is that of "necessity" if the revelation is to be defended and expounded, and on this question there is a good deal of disagreement among theologians. It may be noted that it is possible for a matter to fall within the competence of the magisterium without its being thereby within the range of an infallible exercise of the magisterium. For example, one could argue that the magisterium has a right or even a duty to address many concrete moral issues without implying that they can teach on them infallibly. So, too, to say with Dignitatis humanae 14 that the Church has the authority to teach with regard to "principles of the moral order which flow from human nature itself" is not to say that the Church can teach them infallibly.
That issue and others are resolved by applying the rule of "necessity for the defense and exposition of revelation." Matters necessary for that come within the scope of infallible teaching; matters not so necessary do not. On that basis, it may also be that "principles of the moral order" are necessarily connected with revelation without all concrete applications of those principles being necessarily connected.
Further, whether a matter is necessary for the defense and exposition of revelation cannot always be decided on merely general, a priori, or formal principles. Such considerations may suffice to include, say, the "natural law" within the secondary object of infallibility; but whether concrete specifications of the natural law are necessarily connected requires further inquiry into both the nature of the concrete obligation and the concrete situation in which it is judged to be obligatory. Concrete specifications of the natural law are, obviously, less certain and more variable than general principles. And that lesser certainty and greater variability must qualify interpretative judgments about the necessity of concrete injunctions for the defense and exposition of revelation. It is possible, for example, that in one situation the bishops might teach that it is a Christian responsibility to have large families, while the bishops in another situation teach that it is a Christian responsibility to regulate births; 76 it is even possible that both groups of bishops regard their concrete injunctions as necessary applications of the gospel's demands; it is, finally, possible that both these judgments are true. What is possible in different circumstances at the same time is also possible in different circumstances over a period of time. What in one age might universally be considered a necessary application of the gospel might in another age no longer be considered necessary; and, of course, both judgments could be true. In one set of circumstances or at one time, a concrete prescription might be the only way known in which to defend and apply the gospel; in another set of circumstances or at another time, other ways may be known, and one or more of these could even materially contradict the earlier prescription without there being an instance of formal error. The greater the concreteness of moral instruction, of course, the greater will be the potential variability in any one generation or across several generations. I take it that these are commonplaces of moral theory and that what has classically been known as "prudence" is necessary to apply them well.
Besides the greater variability of concrete moral instruction, there is also its lesser certainty. The generally acknowledged principle that the farther one moves from general principles of revealed or natural morality the less certain one can be of one's conclusions, applies not only to individuals and to moral theologians, but also to bishops, to the whole body of bishops, and to the pope. This need not mean that either moralists or magisterium must or should restrict themselves to general principles; but it does mean that the authority with which they may speak lessens as their prescriptions become more specific and more distant from the general principles. This principle is commonly applied with regard to the "social teaching" of the Church; it is less commonly applied with respect to matters of individual morality, particularly in matters sexual.
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Any interpretation of the universal magisterium, especially with regard to moral issues, must, then, take into account (1) the concrete matter taught, (2) the circumstances in and for which it is taught, (3) the connection established between this concrete matter and revelation, and, should this connection be considered necessary to defend and expound the revelation, (4) the relation between this "necessity" and the concrete circumstances. The first three of these might provide evidence for a "material" continuity or unanimity across different sets of circumstances; but the fourth element must be considered if this continuity or unanimity becoming an area where the birth rate is falling very quickly. The encyclical contains a warning to nations against self-destruction. Certainly those who see in it a prophetic light are correct. This light is especially needed by the nations of the white race" (ibid. 215).
77 It is sometimes said that only the magisterium can determine the extent of its competence and even that the issue can be settled simply by observing the magisterium in action. This is a great oversimplification. The competence of the magisterium is regulated by prior and general truths about revelation, the Church, the Scriptures and tradition, etc. "Only," one sometimes thinks, should be dropped from theologians' vocabularies. is to be "formal" and therefore ecclesiologically or criteriologically significant.
Exercise of Universal Ordinary Magisterium
For an instance of the universal ordinary magisterium to constitute an infallible exercise, not simply any presentation of a doctrine suffices. In the case of the "primary object," the bishops must present the teaching tamquam divinitus revelata; in the case of the "secondary object," they must present it tamquam definitive tenenda. The latter phrase is used to avoid the suggestion that the motive for the assent required is the auctoritas Dei revelantis to which "divine faith" responds. The phrase does not seem to intend an exercise of episcopal authority inferior to that employed in matters taught as "having been divinely revealed."
Since there does not seem to be anything else to be learned from official documents on the matter, perhaps I may be permitted to refer to an auctor probatus for an interpretation of the phrase tamquam definitive tenenda. Salaverri describes the pertinent exercise as one which obliges the faithful to an "utterly free and irrevocable assent"; it therefore occurs on "the highest level of [episcopal] authority." 78 Teachings proposed with such authority he regards as de fide catholica, while those proposed with less authority (mere authentice) he considers to be doctrinae catholicae in the strict sense. 79 Salaverri's interpretation can, of course, make no claim to be authoritative; but it is helpful in indicating that an element of interpretation must enter into the question whether an exercise of the universal ordinary magisterium constitutes an infallible instance. Let us take it, then, that such an exercise means that the bishops intend to place their people under the severest obligation to assent. The difficulty in determining whether this has been realized, of course, is chiefly the fact that bishops seldom use the tamquam definitive tenenda formula or its equivalents. It is no easy task to discriminate in their teaching between what is fundamentally asserted under such serious obligation and what may serve merely as premise, argument, illustration, etc., not to mention what is simply taken for granted. This difficulty has long been acknowledged with regard to teaching de rebus fideif 0 it would seem to be even greater with regard to teaching de moribus. 
Conclusion
I have attempted an application to the universal ordinary magisterium of the three conditions which have been found useful in describing the limits within which the papal magisterium is infallible. It remains simply to indicate that all three of the conditions must be fulfilled for a teaching universally proposed by the episcopal body to be considered infallibly proposed. It must concern a matter of faith or morals which, if not divinely revealed, is necessary to defend and explain what has been revealed. It must be proposed by a moral unanimity of the body of bishops in communion with one another and with the pope. It must be proposed by them as having to be held definitively. If any one of these conditions is not met, the teaching does not constitute an infallible exercise of the magisterium. If it cannot be established that any one of them has been met, then the canonical rule applies and the theologian may proceed on the assumption that he is not dealing with an infallibly proposed teaching.
It may be objected that this view is "maximalistic" in the conditions it requires and therefore "minimalistic" in its conclusions. The objection can be granted, and with good reason. Besides recalling the principles noted at the beginning of this section, one may note that the view here defended supposes that for the magisterium to fulfil its pastoral task it need not often exercise its authority at its highest level. We are emerging from an age marked by an exaggerated fascination with infallibility, 82 which argued, on logically and theologically very dubious grounds, to the necessity of a frequently active iudex controversiarum infallibilis. But the magisterium need not be infallible to have a genuine authority; in fact, it could be argued that the emphasis on infallibility has hindered the development of a more adequate theory and more effective exercise of the "ordinary" magisterium. It tended to abstract the magisterium out from the complex of "authorities" by which the Christian message is borne from generation to generation; and it encouraged the notion that authoritative teaching need not rely on reasoned argument. Where the claim to infallibility is made more modestly, the role of the magisterium in the Church can be understood more realistically, and the Church can display its many "norms of Christian identity and allegiance" in all their distinctive variety and power. The conclusions reached, then, are "mini- malizing." Specifically with regard to the universal ordinary magisterium, I agree with Magnus Löhrer when he concludes: "The true importance of this organ of the Church's teaching office does not seem to he in its criteriological function so much as in the fact that it constitutes the ordinary way in which the Catholic faith is proposed."
83
With regard to the constant and universal condemnation of artificial contraception, it may be remarked, first, that to make a case that this represents an infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium requires interpretation and evaluation. In other words, it is not enough to heap up texts; for texts have meanings in contexts, and the contexts of moral questions are concrete. Without knowing the situations, one cannot understand the contexts, and without understanding the contexts, one cannot understand the meaning of the prescriptions nor evaluate its relevance to or continuity with other meanings in other contexts in other situations. John Noonan's history of Catholic attitudes towards contraception was such an interpretative and evaluative study; it concluded that the tradition was not of such a weight as to preclude development or change. One does not have to canonize the study or its conclusion to urge that a contrary assessment of the tradition must appear to be simply dogmatic if it does not engage in a similar interpretative and evaluative work.
Until such an effort is made, one must be content with an assessment of the role this claim played in the discussions before and after HV. While the "majority" of the Papal Commission did not believe the tradition was of such force as to settle the issue, the "minority" did. 84 A year before HV was issued, Zalba, a member of this minority, reviewed the teaching of the world-wide episcopate, prefacing his study with a reference to Lumen gentium 25. 85 His survey, which he at least did not say was selective, reviewed only eight statements from seven countries, dating from 1909 to 1961. This is something less than the whole body of bishops and, besides, Zalba made no effort to investigate whether the statements meet the conditions necessary for them to be considered an infallible exercise of the magisterium.
In HV itself Pope Paul referred to the Church's tradition several times. In HV4 there is a reference to the Church's fulfilment of Christ's mandate "at all times, but more fully in recent times"; but this concerns general only eleven references to the Church's traditional condemnation. Three of these are rather general, the others more specific. 88 Of the eleven references, nine are found in documents which Selling interprets as displaying a "clear acceptance" of HV; one (West Germany) appears in a document which "mitigates" the encyclical's teaching, and the other (Brazil) in a document Selling regards as "unclear." None of the eleven references invokes the thesis that the tradition is infallible. 89 Many of the episcopal statements, of course, specifically say that HV is "authoritative," not infallible, teaching, and the frequent discussions of the rights and responsibilities of conscience do not favor the thesis.
Finally, there is something like a consensus theologorum that the magisterial tradition behind HV& condemnation does not constitute an infallible exercise of the teaching office. I do not see, then, how one can reply to the question of the infallibility of the magisterial condemnation of artificial contraception with anything but a non constat. Until it has been manifestly established, the general rule should hold that we are not dealing with a matter definitively settled.
ARGUMENT OF THE ENCYCLICAL
The first two sections have argued that the validity of the papal teaching in HV is not settled simply on the formal grounds in papal or traditional authority. In this section the internal argument of the encyclical will be reviewed; for it was, at least in part, an assessment of this that generated the movement from the possibility of dissent to the fact.
The general structure of the encyclical is familiar enough. After brief introductory paragraphs on the contemporary problematic, on the competence of the Church to speak on the issues, and on the work of the Papal Commission (2-6), a central section outlined the doctrinal principles which apply, concluded to the immorality of artificial contraception, replied to objections, and anticipated consequences should the conclusion be neglected (7-18). The last part gave pastoral directives to husbands and wives, educators, public authorities, scientists, medical personnel, priests, and bishops (19-31).
The central section is obviously the most important. Here Pope Paul countries. How significant the "mitigation" is depends in part on whether one believes that the encyclical itself left room for such interpretations; my own view is that it did not. 88 The general references are found in the statements from Brazil, the Philippines, and West Germany; the more specific ones, from Ireland (twice), New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Mexico. 89 The Spanish bishops seemed to locate the "nonprovisional" character of HV's teaching in the Pope's "new and more solemn testimony" (Humanae vitae and the Bishops 247). The West Germans noted the disagreement on the weight to be assigned to the tradition, but abstained from taking a position (ibid. 306, 309-10). first extolled the human and religious value of married love, which he characterized as fully human, total, faithful and exclusive, and fertile (7-9). The Pope then discussed the meaning of "conscious parenthood" in relation to the biological processes, functions, and laws of human reproduction, to sexual instinct and passion, to the physical, economic, psychological, and social conditions in which couples decide about having children, and finally to the demands of the objective moral order (10).
With that as preface, the Pope then taught that marriage acts are "noble and worthy" and legitimate even when known to be naturally infertile; still, the Church continues to assert "that it is necessary that every single marriage act remain of itself destined to procreate human life" (11). That conclusion was then derived from "the inseparable link" between the unitive and procreative meanings {significationes) which God has established in the marriage act (12). To be faithful to God's plan, no act of marriage can contradict either of these intentions (13). From that it follows that any direct interruption of an already begun generation, and especially abortion, is to be absolutely excluded, as also are direct sterilization and any effort before, during, or after intercourse that seeks to prevent procreation (14). The Pope then noted that the Church permits contraceptive interventions for therapeutic purposes, provided they are not directly intended (15), and that it sees a moral difference between artificial and natural means of family-planning (16). Should the use of artificial contraceptives become common, the Pope foresaw very unfortunate consequences (17). In the course of these considerations, the Pope also briefly responded to objections drawn from the claim that man has dominion over his body (13) and from the principle of totality (14).
Some remarks, first, about the character of the Pope's argument. The first is simply to note that it is not drawn from the Scriptures. There are, it is true, sixteen references to New Testament texts, but none of them is employed to found or support the central argument and conclusion. Pope Paul does not mention the story of Onan, which still was cited in Casti connubii.
Secondly, a larger role is played by the argument from tradition, references to which occur some six times. it is not unfair to say that the argument from tradition remains rather undeveloped.
Thirdly, there is not much strict argument at all. That the tradition precludes a change is less argued than assumed. The central affirmation that every marriage act must remain open to the transmission of life is simply asserted, as is the supporting argument that there is an inseparable link between the procreative and unitive meanings of the marriage act. The Pope asserts his belief "that the men of our day are most able to perceive how much this teaching is in conformity with human reason" (12), but he supplies them no assistance apart from the parallel drawn in the following paragraph. Again, the encyclical contains simple assertions about the limits on man's dominion over his body and about the likely consequences of artificial contraception. There is, however, an attempt to argue a moral difference between artificial and natural family-planning.
Evaluations of this method of teaching vary considerably. It has been vigorously defended on the grounds that the Pope was not writing a philosophical or theological treatise and that, besides, his teaching-authority is independent of the reasons he offers. 91 Others, however, have pointed to the psychological effects upon readers of this failure to try to convince or even to facilitate understanding, particularly in a context in which major objections were known to have been addressed against the traditional condemnation.
92 Disagreements here, of course, depend finally on differences in views about the relationship between authority and reason and between magisterium and theology. principle, or both. But in assessing the conclusion, it is important to keep in mind that it is one thing to say that both sexuality and marriage are intrinsically ordered towards procreation and that this must, therefore, be respected in a marriage; it is another thing to say that this provides a principle which must govern every marriage act; and it is still a third thing to say that it provides a means for discriminating among various kinds of contraceptive procedures. With the successive steps in this process of reasoning, the clarity of revelation's guidance decreases, as does also the degree of authority with which the magisterium may teach. And one may legitimately expect that where those two decrease, the responsibility of the magisterium to supply reasoned argument increases.
Finally, the encyclical builds heavily upon moral principles believed to derive from the natural law. Before considering the papal argument more closely, two general remarks may be made. First, I do not myself quarrel with arguments from natural law, and I wish to abstain here from a judgment about the notion of natural law implied in HV. Secondly, however, there seems to be a general agreement that natural-law arguments derive from an exercise of reason which discerns moral responsibilities in the nature and condition of man. Such reasoning is constitutive of natural-law obligations. Two conclusions follow from this. The first Karl Rahner expresses in his comment that "in a question of the natural law it is far from being a matter of indifference whether we realize the intrinsic basis in reality for a norm of the natural law or not." 94 In other words, the failure to have or to give "reasons" for a conclusion differs considerably in significance when one is dealing with the rule of recta ratio rather than with revealed mystery. Secondly, it is difficult to understand how a position can be said to derive from the natural law if no reasons can be adduced to ground it. The conclusion may be urged for other reasons; but it remains simply an assertion to say that something is of the natural law if no reasons can be given in defense of the proposed conclusion.
Besides these general observations, something may be said about the quality of the encyclical's argument from natural law. Presupposing that what the Pope calls the ordo generationis (HV 16) has moral significance, I want to draw attention to a certain abstractness in his argument that I think considerably weakens his case. The encyclical focuses on the single marriage act (quilibet matrimonii usus), which is assigned the two inseparable significationes in itself, so that therefore the exclusion of the procreative intentionality cannot be legitimated on the grounds of the principle of totality. I am less concerned with this isolating of the single act than with the fact that it is also considered in abstraction from the full, concrete reality that is the ordo generationis. This is, in fact, the intelligible relationships among the multiple constituents of the process of human reproduction. The ordo generationis is not a simple per se relationship between single acts of intercourse and instances of conception. In what one might call the natural case (or even the opus naturae), acts of intercourse occur randomly and for a variety of reasons and motives, so that, as the Pope acknowledges, even when they are naturally infertile, they serve to express and strengthen the marriage bond. If one may speak of the "intention" of nature, one may say that it intends such acts to occur often enough that some of them will occur during the relatively brief periods in which the woman can conceive. In this way "nature" fulfils both purposes, assuring the continuation of the race through the same series of acts by which the family community necessary for the child's "education" is preserved and strengthened. The ordo generationis is understood when this total complex-hormonal and biological, instinctual and reflective, interpersonal and cultural, social and religious-is understood; and part of what is understood is the intelligibility that resides in the statistical relationship between randomly posited acts of intercourse and instances of conception.
If that is the concrete intelligibility of the natural "order of generation," then one interferes directly in its operation whenever one introduces "system" into the relationship between acts of intercourse and instances of conception. Artificial contraception does this, of course, by excluding the procreative possibilities of some or all acts of intercourse. But that same "systematizing" occurs when one knowingly restricts one's acts of intercourse to the infertile periods. When such acts are no longer randomly posited, but intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly chosen to occur only at certain times, the ordo generationis loses its "natural" character and is brought in under the rule of reason and freedom: it becomes an opus hominis. If the natural procreative order is understood in its full concreteness, it is difficult to see a morally significant difference between frustrating single acts of intercourse and frustrating the general ordo generationis. It is difficult to see how the use of only the infertile periods "respects the laws of the generative process," or how it does not constitute that "dominion over his generative faculties" which Pope John and Pope Paul denied to man (HV 13).
A similar difficulty attends some recent efforts to articulate an argument in defense of the encyclical from the significationes of the marriage act. Joseph Dolan and William May, for example, speak of human sexual activity as a language: husband and wife are not only doing something, they are saying something, when they engage in intercourse. Intercourse marital infidelity and the weakening of morality, a loss of respect for women, and the placing of a dangerous instrument into the hands of governments. There are a good number of people who are of the view that these consequences have in fact been realized and who see in this a confirmation of the Pope's position.
I do not intend to challenge the view that any or all of these consequences have been realized, nor even that in some fashion they derive from the separation of sexuality from procreation (I do think, however, that more nuance is desirable both in describing the consequences and in determining their causes). I wish only to point out that a certain separation is built into the physical, biological, and interpersonal dynamics of human sexuality, that this separation is also exploited when the use of the infertile periods is coyntenanced, and that a response to the undesirable situation believed to follow from this separation will only be effective, both practically and theoretically, if it proceeds from a more accurate, a more coherent, and a more comprehensive approach to marriage and sexuality than was bequeathed to us by the moral theology of the past. I have no doubt that many of the consequences the Pope feared are only possible because of the availability of contraceptive techniques; but if the use of some of these means is to be proscribed and if this proscription is to be concretely intelligible and effective, it will have to be on more coherent grounds than those proposed in iZVand, above all, by means of a teaching-authority that authenticates itself both by the manner of its exercise and by the persuasiveness of its teaching.
CONCLUSION
Although by no means the last one, the controversy over HV is the most dramatic instance since the Second Vatican Council of what is often called "the crisis of authority" in the Roman Catholic Church. That this is the most adequate description of postconciliar Catholicism can be seriously questioned; but few would dispute that something critical has been going on or that it at least in part concerns the nature and role of authority in the Church. The nature, causes, and implications of this "crisis," of course, receive differing, indeed contradictory, interpretations and evaluations.
This essay has made no attempt to enter that dark thicket; it does not even claim to have exhausted all the issues involved in the particular case of HV. The first two sections have argued that the controversy over the encyclical cannot be settled simply on the grounds of "formal" authority, whether of HV itself or of the tradition behind it. The last section has outlined one fundamental criticism of the argument employed and the conclusion reached by Pope Paul. All three sections have sought chiefly to communicate an understanding, if not an acceptance, of the widespread dissent HV has occasioned.
If there is a basic assumption that has guided this essay, it has been the conviction that questions about authority cannot be answered without asking questions about community and about the relationship between community and authority. The intrinsic relationship between these questions is not always recognized, and not just in ecclesiology, although that has naturally been the focus here. No great progress can be expected in resolving the practical problems in the life of the Church today until, both in practice and in theory, churchmen and theologians succeed in overcoming the assumption of some that authority can be understood and exercised without reference to community, and the view of others that community and authority are antithetical. That is a task long overdue, and if the controversy over HV accelerates commitment to it, it may prove to have been worth whatever pain and confusion it has caused.
